

The Transformation from Classical Nationalism to Green Nationalism

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Abstract. The climate crisis has created a context in which established nationalist categories are increasingly articulated through ecological concerns. This article examines how national identity, homeland/territory, sovereignty, national interest, development, security, citizenship, temporal horizons, and international relations are reconfigured in contemporary green-nationalist scholarship. Using theory-guided qualitative document analysis, this study draws on foundational nationalism scholarship and contemporary research on nationalism, environmentalism, and climate politics. The analysis identifies three substantive green-nationalist configurations—inclusive-civic, developmental-technological, and exclusionary-ecological—and distinguishes institutional forms, hybrid combinations, and symbolic greening as analytically distinct categories. The article argues that green nationalism should not be understood as the inevitable successor to classical nationalism but as a conditional ecological rearticulation of nationalist categories, shaped by identity structures, political institutions, economic and energy interests, climate vulnerability, and international pressures. By separating classification from ecological evaluation, the proposed framework provides a basis for comparing competing forms of green nationalism and for testing their emergence and consequences in future empirical research.

Keywords: Climate Crisis, Classical Nationalism, Environmental Politics, Green Nationalism, National Identity

1 Introduction

Nationalism is one of the most enduring and adaptable ideological frameworks of the modern political order. Nationalist thought gives meaning to the legitimacy of the nation-state, the boundaries of the political community, collective belonging, and claims to sovereignty. Anderson [1], Gellner [2], Hobsbawm [3], and Smith [4], [5] differ substantially in their explanations of nations and nationalism, yet their work places the political community, collective identity, territory, state power, historical memory, and national continuity at the center of analysis.

Climate change and ecological degradation increasingly affect the material conditions within which those categories operate. Water and food insecurity, climate-related disasters, energy transition, biodiversity loss, and climate-induced mobility now intersect with national security, development, economic competition, and foreign policy. Nationalistic studies incorporated climate change relatively late, even though industrialization, fossil-energy systems, and nation-state formation were historically intertwined elements of modernity [6].

Against this background, 'green nationalism' has become more visible, but the concept risks becoming too broad if every environmental reference made in a national context is included. This article therefore uses the term restrictively. Green nationalism requires a national anchoring of ecological concerns; a substantive ecological orientation beyond image management or resource advantage; and constitutive or programmatic

integration of ecological concerns into national identity, homeland, sovereignty, citizenship, collective responsibility, or the national interest [7], [8], [9], [10].

The article also avoids treating the relationship between classical and green nationalism as a universal historical succession. Research documents concrete changes in particular settings, for example, the widening of substate environmental claims toward global climate politics; the simultaneous use of green, resource, and techno-nationalist frames in energy transition; and the incorporation of sustainability into state-led national narratives [10], [11], [12]. These cases justify speaking of ecological rearticulation and historically specific transformation but not of an inevitable movement from one homogeneous form of nationalism to another.

The central question is therefore as follows: how are categories conventionally associated with classical nationalism rearticulated when ecological concerns become part of nationalist politics, and under what conditions do these rearticulations take inclusive-civic, developmental-technological, exclusionary-ecological, or hybrid forms? The contribution is fourfold: it clarifies the comparative use of 'classical nationalism', defines minimum criteria for green nationalism, organizes nine analytical dimensions into a nonlinear comparative framework, and develops a conditional analytical framework linking political and economic conditions to alternative green-nationalist configurations and propositions for future empirical testing.

2. Conceptual Framework and Boundaries

2.1. Classical Nationalism as a Comparative Ideal Type

'Classical nationalism' is used here as a heuristic comparative ideal type, not as a unified theoretical school. Gellner [2] emphasized industrial modernity and cultural standardization; Anderson [1] emphasized the historically imagined character of the political community; Hobsbawm [3] emphasized modern historical construction, state-building, and mass politics; and Smith [4], [5] emphasized myths, memories, symbols, and historical attachments to the homeland. The framework does not merge these causal theories. Instead, it identifies recurring analytical objects that can serve as a baseline for comparison.

Four criteria guide inclusion at this baseline. A category must appear across more than one major tradition of nationalist scholarship; concern the organization or reproduction of the national political community rather than a tradition-specific origin theory; be relevant to comparison with environmental politics; and be general enough to preserve theoretical disagreement. On this basis, the article uses nine dimensions: national identity, homeland/territory, sovereignty, national interest, development, security, citizenship, temporal horizons, and international relations. The dimensions are analytical questions, not claims jointly endorsed by all foundational theorists.

This distinction avoids oversimplification. Identity is not reduced to modernization, territory is not equated with sovereignty, and development is not treated as identical to the national interest. The ideal type is deliberately limited: it provides a comparative vocabulary for asking how established nationalist categories are rearticulated under ecological constraints while preserving disagreements among foundational approaches. The foundational works do not explicitly theorize all nine dimensions in identical terms. Rather, they supply recurring baseline objects—political community, collective identity, territory, state power, historical construction, memory, and continuity—from which the nine comparative questions are derived. Security, national interest, citizenship, and international relations are therefore retained as comparative questions where these baseline objects become politically consequential under ecological conditions, not as propositions jointly endorsed by all foundational theorists.

Table 1. Foundational Traditions and the Comparative Baseline

Foundational work/tradition	Primary emphasis stated in this article	Comparative baseline contribution
Gellner [2]	Industrial modernity and cultural standardization	Collective identity, social organization, development and state-centered reproduction of national community
Anderson [1]	Historically imagined political community	Political community, collective identity and the boundaries of belonging
Hobsbawm [3]	Modern historical construction, state-building and mass politics	State power, political organization and historical construction of national continuity
Smith [4], [5]	Myths, memories, symbols and historical attachments to homeland	Identity, homeland/territory, memory and temporal continuity

Note: The matrix identifies the baseline objects explicitly attributed to the foundational authors in this article. This does not imply that every author directly theorizes each of the nine dimensions. The remaining dimensions function as comparative questions developed from these recurring objects and from their ecological rearticulation in the contemporary literature.

2.2. Minimum Criteria and Scope of Green Nationalism

A phenomenon is classified as green nationalism only when three conditions are jointly present. First, ecological concerns must be explicitly anchored in a constitutive nationalist category, such as identity, homeland, sovereignty, citizenship, national continuity, or national interest. Second, ecological protection, mitigation, adaptation, or resilience must have substantive value as a collective objective rather than serving only economic growth, energy independence, geopolitical competition, or national image. Third, ecological concerns must be integrated into sustained political claims, institutions, mobilization, or policy commitments rather than appearing as isolated references to landscapes or national branding [7], [8], [10].

These criteria distinguish green nationalism from adjacent phenomena. Ordinary environmental policy lacks green-nationalist status when no constitutive national frame is present. Ecological modernization is not green nationalism merely because a state adopts cleaner technology. Resource nationalism remains analytically distinct when nature is primarily an extractive or strategic asset. Symbolic greening and greenwashing are treated as boundary cases where environmental-national rhetoric lacks sufficient substantive ecological commitment [13]. Exclusionary eco-nationalism qualifies only when a genuine ecological objective is integrated into an exclusionary national project rather than when environmental language merely masks nativism [14], [15].

For classification, the three criteria operate as a sequential decision rule. If ecological concerns are not anchored in a constitutive national category, the phenomenon is treated as environmental policy or another nonnational environmental project rather than as green nationalism. If a national frame is present but ecological protection, mitigation, adaptation, or resilience has no substantive collective value beyond growth, energy autonomy, geopolitical advantage, or image management, the case remains resource nationalism, ecological modernization, or symbolic greening rather than green nationalism. If the first two conditions are met but ecological concerns appear only as isolated rhetoric without sustained claims, institutions, mobilization, or policy commitments, the case is treated as incidental environmental nationalism rather than a consolidated green-nationalist configuration. Only cases satisfying all three conditions enter the green-nationalism typology. The substantive configuration is then coded separately from the institutional location, allowing a case to be inclusive-civic, developmental-technological, or exclusionary-ecological while also being substate/autonomy-oriented or state-centered/top-down. When more than one substantive logic is documented simultaneously, the case is classified as hybrid.

Accordingly, 'transformation' in this article refers primarily to the reconfiguration of nationalist categories when ecological concerns become constitutive of their meaning. This does not imply that all nationalisms are moving in the same direction. Earlier logics of sovereignty, resource control, territorial closure, and competition may persist alongside ecological responsibility, renewable-energy policy, or climate cooperation. The appropriate conceptual language is therefore conditional rearticulation, coexistence, and hybridity rather than linear replacement.

3. Method

3.1. Research Design and Source Selection

The study employs theory-guided qualitative document analysis and comparative thematic synthesis. The literature was selected purposively according to its theoretical and analytical relevance rather than through an exhaustive or statistically representative systematic review protocol. Foundational works on nationalism provide a comparative baseline [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], whereas contemporary research provides the principal material for examining the ecological rearticulation of nationalist categories [6], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28].

Supplementary conceptual works were used where adjacent dimensions required clarification, including ecological citizenship, green-state theory, climate security, climate mobility, national interest, and the political economy of greening [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34].

Contemporary studies were retained when nationalism, national identity, sovereignty, or national belonging was a substantive analytical component; the work directly addressed an ecological, climate, or energy issue; and it contributed to the article's analytical dimensions or conceptual boundaries. Works concerned only with environmental policy without substantive engagement with nationalism, purely extractive resource politics without an ecological dimension, or incidental references to nationalist terminology were not treated as part of the principal analytical literature.

Selection was guided by conceptual relevance rather than by an attempt to assemble literature supporting a predetermined transformation thesis. Critical and contradictory evidence was retained, including research on climate obstruction, greenwashing, exclusionary environmental politics, and heterogeneous framing effects [13], [18], [23], [24]. The resulting source base is therefore used for theory-guided qualitative synthesis, not for claims of systematic review completeness, meta-analytic representativeness, or bibliometric exhaustiveness.

3.2. Analytical Procedure and Limits

The nine-dimensional framework was refined through a combined deductive-inductive procedure. A theory-led provisional codebook was derived from foundational nationalism scholarship; contemporary studies were then read iteratively to clarify boundaries and identify recurrent ecological reinterpretations. National interest and development were retained separately because they address strategic ends and models of material progress, respectively. The temporal horizon and international relations were retained because intergenerational responsibility and transboundary ecological politics repeatedly emerged as distinct questions.

The dimensions are analytically distinguishable but empirically overlapping. Identity asks how the collective 'we' is defined; homeland/territory, how national space is valued; sovereignty, where legitimate authority resides; national interest, whose collective outcomes are strategically desirable; development, how material and technological progress is pursued; security, what is threatened and protected; citizenship, whose rights and duties attach to members; temporal horizons, which past or future structure national continuity; and international relations, how national projects relate to external actors and responsibilities. Multicoding was allowed when a case addressed more than one question.

The analysis also distinguishes three evidentiary levels. Findings directly established by reviewed studies are reported as empirical evidence; propositions developed by comparison studies are presented as analytical interpretations or expectations; and ecological effectiveness, inclusiveness, and transboundary responsibility are treated as explicit evaluative criteria rather than empirical facts. This distinction is especially important because individual-level findings on national identification cannot automatically be generalized to state or party performance [16], [21]. The study remains a theory-guided qualitative analysis, not a systematic review, meta-analysis, or validated measurement exercise.

4. Ecological Reconfiguration of Nationalist Categories

The nine dimensions are retained in Table 2 for analytical precision, but they are discussed below in four broader thematic clusters to avoid presenting them as nine distinct stages of transformation. The table therefore maps classical emphases, possible ecological rearticulations, and competing or hybrid configurations rather than implying a single, linear, or predetermined trajectory of change.

Table 2. Competing and Hybrid Reconfigurations of Nationalist Categories

Dimension	Classical emphasis	Possible ecological rearticulation	Competing/hybrid possibility
National identity	Shared history, culture, belonging	Ecological responsibility and stewardship enter national self-understanding	Civic responsibility may coexist with prestige or exclusion
Homeland/territory	Sovereign historical space	Homeland as an ecosystem requiring continuity	Stewardship may coexist with territorial exclusivity
Sovereignty	Supreme national authority	Responsibility for transboundary ecological effects	Responsible sovereignty may coexist with protectionism
National interest	Power, autonomy, resource control	Climate resilience and long-term habitability	Extraction and resilience may compete within the same discourse
Development	Industrialization, production, infrastructure	Low-carbon transition, efficiency, renewable energy	Green technology may reproduce growth-oriented developmentalism
Security	Territory, borders, military capacity	Climate, water, food, energy, disaster resilience	Climate security may coexist with border securitization
Citizenship	Rights, duties, loyalty, membership	Ecological duties and intergenerational responsibility	Ecological duties may be inclusive or in-group bounded
Temporal horizon	Origins, memory, historical continuity	Future generations and long-term sustainability	Past- and future-oriented narratives may coexist
International relations	Competition among sovereign units	Climate cooperation and ecological interdependence	Cooperation may coexist with green-tech and resource competition

Sources: Gellner [2]; Anderson [1]; Hobsbawm [3]; Smith [4], [5]; Conversi [6]; Eckersley [31]; Conversi and Posocco [17]; Posocco and McNeill [19]; Cislak et al. [16]; Tutt and Heubbaum [11]; Yücel et al. [9]; Conversi et al. [18].

4.1. Identity, Homeland, and Citizenship

Classical nationalism constructs identity through shared history, language, culture, memory, political belonging, and attachment to the homeland. Green nationalism can add an ecological dimension by treating natural heritage and environmental stewardship as elements of national continuity. Yücel et al. [9] explicitly connect green nationalism to 'green memory', a 'green homeland', and ecological citizenship, whereas Posocco and Watson [20] show how environmental achievement can recode historically charged territory as a source of collective identity and pride.

This rearticulation does not guarantee inclusion. A green homeland can be understood as a shared ecological inheritance, but it can also be framed as the exclusive possession of a supposedly native community. Aronczyk [14] showed how ecological threat can be linked to protectionist sovereignty and exclusion, whereas Sharma [15] demonstrated that environmental symbols can coexist with religious and cultural boundary-making. The political meaning of ecological territory therefore depends on how the national community is defined.

Citizenship introduces a related distinction between identity and obligation. Ecological citizenship expands conventional rights and duties toward responsibility for consumption, environmental impact, and future generations [30]. Empirically, secure national identification is positively associated with support for renewable energy and some climate policies, whereas national narcissism shows a less favorable pattern and stronger support for fossil fuel energy [16]. Similarly, Aydın et al. [21] reported positive associations between constructive patriotism/global identification and pro-environmentalism and negative associations between nationalism and several environmental outcomes. These studies support the narrower conclusion that forms of national identification matter; they do not prove that every civic or inclusive national project produces superior ecological outcomes.

4.2. Sovereignty, Security, and International Relations

Climate change exposes the limits of sovereignty understood only as noninterference within territorial borders because emissions, ecological degradation, and energy choices generate effects beyond the state. Green-state theory therefore links sovereign capacity to ecological stewardship and transboundary responsibility [31]. However, sovereignty can also be greened in a protectionist direction. Eco-nationalist discourse may justify tighter borders, restricted mobility, or exclusive claims over resources and territory [14].

Security displays the same duality. Climate change broadens the object of security from territorial defense toward water, food, energy, disaster resilience, and the conditions of social reproduction [32], [33]. At the same time, securitizing climate-induced mobility can redirect ecological risk into border and migration politics [29]. Green nationalism can therefore make climate vulnerability politically salient without necessarily producing cooperative or democratic responses.

International relations are consequently characterized by simultaneous cooperation and competition. National climate strategies depend on international agreements and shared ecological systems, yet states also compete over renewable-energy industries, critical minerals, technology, and energy autonomy. Hau [10] illustrates how substate actors combine local political claims with global climate responsibility, whereas Conversi et al. [18] show that resource, energy, and techno-nationalist logics can obstruct climate action. Ecological interdependence thus modifies, but does not eliminate, the competitive structure of nationalist politics.

4.3. National Interest and Development

National interest and development are closely related but analytically distinct. National interest concerns which outcomes are defined as necessary for national welfare, autonomy, or strategic position; development concerns the economic and technological model used to pursue progress. Climate change can bring resilience, energy security, and long-term habitability into definitions of national interest without automatically displacing growth-oriented development [6], [32].

The energy transition makes this overlap particularly visible. Tutt and Heubaum [11] show that renewable energy can be appropriated through green nationalism, resource nationalism, and techno-nationalism at the same time. A state may therefore reduce fossil dependence while preserving familiar narratives of national resources, energy independence, technological leadership, and geopolitical competition. The content of national interest can become greener, whereas the competitive logic of national interest remains intact.

Development presents a parallel distinction between technological substitution and deeper ecological change. Political-economic research cautions that greening is shaped by existing interests and institutions [34], whereas Marquardt [27] shows how environmental politics can shift toward ecological modernization and technocentric solutions. State-centered cases reinforce this point: sustainability may be incorporated into modernization, performance legitimacy, and national prestige in China and the UAE [12], [22]. These examples support the concept of developmental-technological green nationalism but also explain why green modernization should not be equated automatically with transformative environmental outcomes.

4.4. Temporal Horizon and Intergenerational Responsibility

Classical nationalism derives much of its legitimacy from historical memory, origins, sacrifice, and continuity with the past. Green nationalism can extend this temporal axis by incorporating future generations into the national narrative. National heritage then includes not only monuments, memories, and cultural traditions but also the ecological conditions required for future life. Reflexive green nationalism makes this temporal extension explicit by connecting national self-critique to the ecological consequences of modernization [8].

The shift is best understood as expansion rather than replacement. Past-oriented memory remains central, whereas future-oriented responsibility adds a second temporal reference. This is why intergenerational language is analytically distinct from development or citizenship even though it overlaps with both: it changes the time horizon through which national continuity and obligation are evaluated [9].

5. Configurations, Conditional Model, and Evaluation

5.1. Green-Nationalist Configurations and Boundary Cases

The literature does not support a single green-nationalist type. To avoid conflating substantive political logics with the institutional location in which they appear, the typology is organized hierarchically. Three substantive configurations are distinguished: inclusive-civic, developmental-technological, and exclusionary-ecological. Substate/autonomy-oriented and state-centered/top-down forms are treated as institutional-location overlays rather than mutually exclusive substantive types. Hybridity denotes the simultaneous presence of more than one substantive configuration within the same actor-policy-domain-time-period, whereas symbolic greening/greenwashing remains a boundary case that does not qualify as green nationalism when the substantive ecological criterion is not satisfied. Classification should therefore use the actor-policy domain—time period as the unit of analysis rather than treating states or parties as permanently homogeneous.

Table 3. Hierarchical Classification of Green-Nationalist Configurations and Boundary Cases

Category/status	Core logic	Observable indicators	Classification rule
Inclusive-civic (substantive)	Ecology as shared national responsibility	Civic/pluralist membership; intergenerational or justice claims; compatibility with cooperation	Primary substantive configuration
Developmental-technological (substantive)	Ecological goals integrated into modernization, energy transition, technological capacity, or national development	Low-carbon transition; efficiency; renewable energy; green-industry or technological leadership claims	Primary substantive configuration; may coexist with growth-oriented developmentalism
Exclusionary-ecological (substantive)	Substantive ecological goals combined with restrictive belonging	Native-land/purity narratives; outsiders framed as ecological pressure; restrictive mobility claims	Primary substantive configuration only where substantive ecological objectives are present
Substate/autonomy-oriented (institutional overlay)	Environmental performance or ecological governance supports self-government claims	Substate national actor; ecology linked to autonomy/devolution; governing-capacity claims	Institutional-location overlay; may combine with any substantive configuration
State-centered/top-down (institutional overlay)	Central institutions integrate ecological concerns into modernization, legitimacy, or national strategy	State-led narrative; centralized green investment; climate diplomacy; national prestige	Institutional-location overlay; may combine with any substantive configuration
Hybrid (cross-cutting status)	More than one substantive logic is present in the same unit of analysis	Simultaneous inclusive, developmental-technological, or exclusionary elements	Use only when multiple substantive configurations are documented for the same actor-policy-domain-time-period
Symbolic greening/greenwashing (boundary case)	Green national image without sufficient substantive ecological commitment	Nation branding; implementation gap; image management alongside obstruction	Not green nationalism proper when the substantive ecological criterion fails

Sources: Hamilton [25]; Conversi and Friis Hau [7]; Hau [10]; Kerr [26]; Arantes [22]; Koch [12]; Aronczyk [14]; Sharma [15]; Cislak et al. [13]; Conversi et al. [18].

5.2. A Conditional Analytical Framework and Propositions for Future Testing

The typology becomes theoretically stronger when linked to conditions under which different substantive configurations are expected to emerge. The framework proposed here is deliberately conditional rather than deterministic and should not be read as a validated macrocausal model. Climate vulnerability, energy-transition pressures, and international expectations create ecological pressure; regime characteristics, the national identity structure, energy dependence, and economic interests condition how that pressure is interpreted; and political mechanisms such as framing, legitimation, securitization, coalition formation, and policy translation connect conditions to possible configuration outcomes. The actor-policy-domain-time-period remains the proposed unit of analysis, so institutional location can be coded separately from substantive configuration and hybrid status.

Four propositions organize future empirical testing. P1: Inclusive-civic configurations are more likely where national identification is relatively secure or civic, participation is politically viable, and international ecological responsibility is not framed as incompatible with sovereignty. P2: Developmental–technological configurations should be more likely where state capacity, green–industrial opportunity, energy–autonomy concerns, and competitiveness incentives are strong. P3: Exclusionary-ecological configurations should be more likely where ecological vulnerability is interpreted through defensive identity, scarcity, borders, or demographic threat. P4: High fossil dependence should increase the likelihood of hybrid or obstructionist outcomes unless transition costs are offset by credible alternative economic interests [11], [12], [16], [18]. These propositions specify directional expectations for future research; they are not causal findings established by the present qualitative analysis.

Table 4. Conditioning Factors in the Proposed Conditional Analytical Framework

Conditioning factor	Observable indicators	Expected relevance
Regime type	Electoral competition; civil-society autonomy; executive concentration	Shapes participatory, contested, or state-directed greening
National identity structure	Civic/ethnic framing; secure identification; national narcissism; minority/migrant treatment	Conditions inclusive versus defensive/exclusionary articulation
Energy dependence	Fossil production/import dependence; hydrocarbon revenues; extractive employment	Raises transition costs and may strengthen resource-nationalist or hybrid narratives
Climate vulnerability	Exposure to heat, drought, floods, water/food stress, disasters	Raises ecological salience but does not determine framing
Economic interests	Fossil-sector power; green-industry investment; transition-cost distribution	Conditions obstruction, technological absorption, or broader change
International pressure	Climate commitments; trade/decarbonization pressure; climate diplomacy; reputational incentives	Can stimulate cooperation, state-led greening, symbolic adaptation, or backlash

Sources: Conditional analytical framework synthesized from Hau [10], Aydın et al. [21], Cislak et al. [16], Tutt and Heubaum [11], Koch [12], Nakai [28], Marquardt [27], and Conversi et al. [18].

These propositions require independent empirical testing. Cross-national and longitudinal designs could be used to examine whether combinations of identity structure, regime characteristics, energy dependence, climate vulnerability, economic interests, and international pressure predict different substantive configurations over time. Manifesto, speech, and policy coding could operationalize configuration outcomes at the actor-policy-domain-time-period level, whereas mixed-method designs could examine the mechanisms linking conditions to outcomes. Hybrid cases should be coded when more than one substantive configuration is documented within the same unit of analysis rather than treated as a residual category. Evidence showing no systematic association between the proposed conditioning factors and configuration outcomes would count against the corresponding propositions.

5.3. Evaluating Green Nationalism

The classification and evaluation are analytically separate. A phenomenon may satisfy the three minimum criteria for green nationalism while still performing poorly in terms of ecological effectiveness, inclusiveness, or transboundary responsibility. The article therefore evaluates qualifying green-nationalist configurations along three analytically independent dimensions that should not be collapsed into a single additive score. Ecological effectiveness asks whether claims translate into emission reduction, renewable-energy transition, reduced fossil dependence, ecosystem protection, or resilience. Inclusiveness asks whether environmental benefits, burdens, participation, and membership are organized through civic and pluralist or exclusionary boundaries. Transboundary responsibility asks whether a project implements international climate commitments, cooperates

across borders, recognizes exported environmental costs, and avoids treating ecological responsibility exclusively domestically [13], [14], [16], [18], [21], [31].

Table 5. Three-Dimensional Evaluative Framework

Dimension	Core question	Illustrative observable indicators
Ecological effectiveness	Do claims produce substantive environmental outcomes?	Emissions trajectory; renewable-energy transition; fossil dependence; climate-target implementation; ecosystem/adaptation outcomes
Inclusiveness	Who is included and how are costs and benefits distributed?	Civic/ethnic boundary framing; migrant/minority treatment; environmental justice; participation; nativist narratives
Transboundary responsibility	Are ecological obligations beyond national borders recognized?	International commitments; climate finance; cross-border cooperation; outsourced emissions; climate mobility; burden shifting

Sources: Eckersley [31]; Conversi [6]; Aydın et al. [21]; Cislak et al. [13], [16]; Aronczyk [14]; Conversi et al. [18].

The framework should be used as a profile rather than a single additive score: strong ecological performance does not erase exclusionary membership, and inclusive rhetoric does not compensate for weak environmental outcomes. These dimensions evaluate the consequences and qualities of a configuration after classification; they do not determine whether the phenomenon initially qualifies as green nationalism. The indicators are analytical proposals, not a validated scale.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

The comparative analysis supports a more limited conclusion than a linear transition from classical nationalism to green nationalism. Contemporary green-nationalist formations are better understood as ecological rearticulations of established nationalist categories. The nine dimensions identify where rearticulation can occur, but they do not move in a single direction. Ecological responsibility can coexist with national prestige, responsible sovereignty with territorial closure, renewable-energy development with techno-nationalist competition, and climate security with border securitization.

This interpretation also clarifies the meaning of the empirical evidence. The reviewed studies directly establish particular relationships: secure and defensive forms of national identification are associated differently with climate and energy-policy support [16]; patriotism, nationalism, and global identification show different associations with pro-environmentalism [21]; nationalist environmental framing has heterogeneous effects across audiences [23]; and state, substate, and energy-transition cases document specific ways in which environmental claims are integrated into nationalist projects [7], [10], [11], [12]. Broader claims about inclusive, developmental, or exclusionary pathways remain comparative interpretations and testable expectations rather than universal causal findings.

The analysis therefore rejects two simplifications. First, classical nationalism should not be represented as uniformly anti-environmental: national attachment, state capacity, and territorial responsibility can, under some conditions, support ecological policy. Second, green nationalism should not be treated as inherently progressive: environmental discourse may coexist with resource extraction, authoritarian legitimation, greenwashing, geopolitical rivalry, or nativist exclusion [12], [14], [18]. The politically relevant question is not simply whether nationalism becomes 'green', but how ecological concerns are incorporated, by whom, and with what outcomes.

The proposed framework contributes by integrating five analytically distinct elements without turning them into separate theories. First, the nine dimensions specify what is being ecologically rearticulated. Second, the three minimum criteria determine when an environmental-national phenomenon qualifies as green nationalism. Third, the hierarchical typology distinguishes substantive configurations from institutional-location overlays, hybrid combinations, and nonqualifying boundary cases. Fourth, the conditional analytical framework identifies factors and mechanisms that may shape variation and formulates propositions for future testing. Fifth, the three evaluative dimensions assess outcomes without equating national green rhetoric with environmental success. This architecture—classification criteria, multidimensional rearticulation, hierarchical configurations, conditioning factors, and separate evaluation—conforms the article's principal conceptual contribution.

Several limitations remain. Source identification was exploratory and theory-guided rather than preregistered or systematic, so the article does not claim exhaustive or statistically representative coverage of the literature. The literature is heterogeneous in method and level of analysis, and the proposed indicators, hierarchical classifications, and conditioning pathways have not been validated through systematic comparative coding or causal inference. Future research should therefore test the propositions explicitly with longitudinal and cross-national designs, alongside manifesto, speech, and policy coding at the actor-policy-domain-time-period

level. Such research could assess whether particular combinations of identity structure, regime characteristics, energy dependence, vulnerability, economic interests, and international pressure systematically predict inclusive-civic, developmental-technological, exclusionary-ecological, or hybrid outcomes.

Ultimately, the ecological reconfiguration of nationalism is a contested process rather than a completed transition. The nation-state remains central to climate policy, but ecological limits alter the terms through which homeland, sovereignty, development, security, citizenship, and national responsibility are debated. Whether these rearticulations support inclusive-civic responsibility, developmental-technological competition, exclusionary-ecological politics, or hybrid combinations is an empirical question. The theoretical value of green nationalism lies precisely in making those competing possibilities visible while providing a transparent basis for future longitudinal and cross-national tests rather than assuming a single green trajectory.

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